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Abstract: In this paper we will analyze the relationship between free market 
principles and ethics through an exploration of how too many business 
managers often approach the ideas of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman. In 
doing so, we aim to provide a thoughtful foundation for future discussions of 
how we ought to navigate this intersection. We briefly examine questions 
such as: What is the relationship between the “best” economy in terms of 
efficiency and the common good for society? Is pursuing one’s individual 
economic advantage the same as promoting the general interest? As we 
analyze and discuss these questions, specifically in the context of Smith and 
Friedman, we also make some alternative normative assertions, grounded in 
social welfare, about adopting a broader societal perspective for the purpose 
of business. 
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Introduction 
 
The latter half of the 20th century brought with it a shift in 
political and economic thought—both in the minds of academics, and in 
the popular US culture. No longer was the market merely a dynamic 
instrument of exchange—a tool which when used properly, could help 
industrialized societies rapidly achieve resource allocation and 
distribution. Ushered in by Robert Nozick’s (1974) magnum opus, 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia, the free market would become more than 
an instrument, it would transform into the barometer of morality itself. 
In recent years, this line of thinking has evolved to become an 
increasingly powerful mantra in Western capitalist democracies, and 
two titans of free market thought have become flagbearers for an 
arguably muddled and sometimes destructive message. 
 
In this paper, we will discuss the impact that the writings of 
Adam Smith and Milton Friedman have had on popular beliefs about 
the free market, and on conceptions of free market morality. Hovering 
around and above the debate between welfare liberalism and laissez-
faire capitalism are misunderstood portraits of two great thinkers—
caricatures that have been stretched beyond what was written and 
spoken. We will deconstruct the sometimes warped portraits of Smith 
and Friedman, and in so doing, we hope to lay the foundations for a 
more informed dialogue in both practitioner and academic settings. 
Finally, we will discuss the normative implications of a balanced 
reading of both thinkers, and how a shift in our economic lens from 
strict efficiency to overall effectiveness may lead to a greater well-
being for individuals and society. In other words, efficient economic 
exchange alone may not be the pathway to the most effective market 
outcomes. For example, the exchange of “money for product” between 
buyers of gas-guzzling SUVs and their manufacturers may produce 
satisfied parties on both ends of the transaction but whether this 
outcome, with its inherent environmental impacts, is the most 
effective exchange that might occur is another question entirely. 
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The Popular Conceptions of Adam Smith and 
Milton Friedman 
 
Adam Smith is rightly considered one of the founding fathers of 
modern economics. His book, The Wealth of Nations, has become a 
legendary tome on workings of an efficient economy, and the healthy 
relationship between states and markets (Ross 1985). But public 
discourse about such matters has become warped as nuanced 
concepts such as “market efficiency” and “minimal government 
intervention” have been used to denigrate or support a variety of 
political and economic positions. 
 
In this essay, we will mainly focus on one of Smith’s enduring 
legacies—the metaphor of the invisible hand. The most common 
interpretation of Adam Smith’s metaphor of the invisible hand is one of 
an autonomous, self-regulatory entity that ensures that the market, 
when properly functioning via rationally self-interested exchange, will 
achieve the most economically efficient results (Mueller 1993). Some 
expand this argument further and suggest that the most economically 
efficient outcome also produces the most moral result. To understand 
how pervasive this interpretation is, consider one popular culture and 
convenient description: 
 
“In economics, the invisible hand of the market is a metaphor 
used by Adam Smith to describe the self-regulating behavior of 
the marketplace” (Wikipedia 2013). 
 
The invisible hand as so conceived suggests that free markets 
are a necessary condition for free actors to engage economically in a 
productive manner. Unless the free market is respected as a self-
regulating entity, efficient exchange between parties will be dampened 
and even damaged. At its most robust, the concept of the invisible 
hand also substitutes for government regulations and ethical rules of 
business. Tariffs, subsidies, antitrust rules, consumer protections, and 
more (according to some) are unnecessary since the market itself will 
dictate proper and fair play. As the invisible hand ensures the best 
results when properly regarded, external regulation is worse than 
superfluous; it is downright destructive. Consider a company that 
attempts to cheat its customers by selling products it knows to be of 
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poor quality. In theory, once word gets out, customers will not buy 
said good, economically punishing the company. This force, more than 
any regulation, ought to compel companies to offer quality goods and 
services. In this manner, the invisible hand also drives markets toward 
more moral results. This reading has become a dominant 
interpretation in the greater business community (Buchanan 1985). 
While there are strong arguments to be made that this is not what 
Smith intended, especially given his work in Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, we will focus on this “market supremacy” oriented view 
initially before expanding our analysis to include a further nuance 
of Smith’s thinking. 
 
Milton Friedman was an extremely influential economist and 
leader of the Chicago school of economics. While his Nobel Prize was 
awarded for his research into monetary history and theory, his famous 
New York Times essay, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to 
Increase Profits,” set an agenda for the relationship between the 
market and morality that has only magnified today (Butler 1985). The 
New York Times essay popularized the view about social responsibility 
that Friedman had previously advocated in his 1962 book, Capitalism 
and Freedom, where he wrote: 
 
Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundation 
of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a 
social responsibility other than to make as much money for their 
stockholders as possible. This is a fundamentally subversive 
doctrine. If businessmen do have a social responsibility other 
than making maximum profits for their stockholders, how are 
they to know what it is? Can self-selected private individuals 
decide what the social interest is (Friedman 2002, p. 133)? 
 
Below we will focus on that argument and how it has informed 
discussions of business ethics, and corporate social responsibility. 
Today, many perceive a tug of war between two dominant theories in 
the world of business ethics. This conflict plays out in the classroom, 
on social media, and on cable TV news. Stakeholder theories (Freeman 
2010) and shareholder theories of corporate responsibility are pitted 
against each other in binary battles of greed versus altruism, liberal 
versus conservative, free market versus government interventionism. 
Some paint a picture of Friedman as an advocate of corporate greed, 
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unrestrained markets, and profit over and above social goods. Others 
portray Friedman as a paragon of business freedom, deregulation, the 
intrinsic societal good of private profit, and even of capitalism as the 
embodiment of morality. While few modern academics endorse such 
rigid views, we still encounter them frequently in the political arena, 
and such reality matters greatly from a public policy standpoint. 
Advocates for minimal market interventions cherry pick pieces of 
Wealth of Nations and Capitalism and Freedom to further their world 
view. Lost in this thrust is that Friedman not only allows for the law 
but expects it to constrain business, plus, he is also aggressively anti-
monopoly (Friedman 2002, p. 131–132). 
 
Friedman’s New York Times essay unleashed a flurry of 
discussion both in academic circles as well as in the business 
community. To this day, business ethics professors around the country 
dedicate days of class-time to having students read and discuss the 
piece. In business symposia, MBA classrooms, and even academic 
journal analysis, the Friedman article is often framed as a showcase of 
the clash between profits versus ethics by critics and of ethics through 
profits by proponents (Jennings 2012).  
 
Support for Friedman’s argument often comes in a particular 
flavor that one might find familiar after discussing the modern 
narrative surrounding Adam Smith. In arguments repeated in 
textbooks and in classrooms, proponents of Friedman’s argument 
against CSR rely on an appeal to the distinction between private and 
public property. For the typical business (publicly held or not), self-
interested actions in the name of profit maximization, is the most 
rational course of action. As long as the business is not intentionally 
causing legally demonstrable harm, it should not be restrained in its 
economic pursuit. Forcing or even suggesting that business to do 
something for the greater social good would not only harm the 
business unfairly, but might not even succeed at its intended goal. 
CSR contradicts the primary function of a business, which is profit. If a 
business’s role in society is to make money for its owners, it seems 
logical that by striving to maximize profits, a business is doing the best 
thing it can do for the community it resides in. Some extrapolate 
beyond this point and suggest that any regulation is a form of 
attempting to enforce efficiency-eroding CSR principles, and thus is 
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unjustified and harmful. We can recall interpretations of Smith that 
also suggest unfettered profit maximization will always generate the 
best results for all involved (Gaski 2013). 
Criticism both from the public and others in the academic 
community has often been harsh, denouncing Friedman’s argument as 
morally bankrupt. Sometimes even business executives have 
powerfully sounded their doubts. In 1979, Quaker Oats president 
Kenneth Mason famously wrote that Friedman’s philosophy was “a 
dreary and demeaning view of the role of business and business 
leaders in our society. Making a profit is no more the purpose of a 
corporate than getting enough to eat is the purpose of life. Getting 
enough to eat is a requirement of life; life’s purpose, one would hope, 
is somewhat broader and more challenging. Likewise with business 
and profit (1979).” 
 
Critics of unconstrained commercial operations, like Mason and 
many business ethics faculty members, see business as a powerful 
force with social responsibilities. But some critics also minimize, or at 
least disregard, the impact that good external oversight (i.e., 
regulation) might have on economic systems and its business dealings. 
Good regulation, as we discuss, is left on the sideline by some in favor 
of a discussion about what a business ought to do of its own volition. 
 
As we move forward, we will begin to pull apart these 
depictions, and suggest (we hope) a richer and more nuanced view of 
Smith and Friedman. 
 
Deconstructing the Simplified Portrait of Adam 
Smith 
 
As mentioned earlier, in the media, classrooms, and academic 
journals, Adam Smith is often cited as a proponent of free trade, and a 
critic of government intervention. Unfortunately, while much of this 
has some foundations in the truth, it is nevertheless not always clear 
what writers mean when they use terms such as “free trade,” and 
“government intervention” to extrapolate the thinking of Smith. 
 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Smith lays the 
foundation for his views about self-interest, and the common good. In 
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Moral Sentiments, Smith points out we humans have a strong altruistic 
tendency to be other-regarding in our actions. 
 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently 
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune 
of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though 
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing 
it…(2002, p. 11) 
 
For Smith, such sympathy helps guide our understanding of the 
sentiments of others. We sympathize with another, because we can 
understand what others are feeling in a particular situation—a tenet of 
Smith’s writings that we will touch on again below. What then do we 
make of Smith’s appeal to self-interest in The Wealth of Nations? Does 
Smith abandon his views on “other-regarding” in The Wealth of 
Nations (1776) in favor of self-interested economic gain? Some have 
called this apparent turnabout the “Adam Smith problem” but we have 
good reason to think that this is not the case (Wilson 1989). 
Throughout his life, Smith continued to revise the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, implying clearly that he did not repudiate it. And he 
remains concerned, throughout The Wealth of Nations, with an 
overarching justice that an efficient economy can be a part of, but 
cannot replace. Pure selfishness tends toward results that actually 
harm the free market. Short-sighted selfishness is not the same as 
self-interest, and it is actually a threat to a well-functioning society 
(Werhane 1989). 
 
To illustrate this key point, we will work through two famous 
passages from Smith’s, The Wealth of Nations. First, let us consider 
Smith’s oft cited example of the Butcher, Brewer, and Baker. 
 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their 
own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but 
to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities 
but of their advantages (2001, p. 15). 
 
In addition to this passage, the Invisible Hand is perhaps the 
single most famous concept credited to Smith. It is presented to us, 
much as the butcher, brewer, and baker passage, as Smith 
hammering home the value and benefits of an unrestricted free 
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market. The message to the uninitiated is clear—a good economy 
needs no oversight, no regulation, and no interference. The market 
regulates itself with an invisible hand, Smith seems to be telling us, 
but is that really the case? Here’s the original quotation about the 
motivation of producers: 
 
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, 
he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry 
in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, 
he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other 
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no 
part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society 
that it was not part of it. By pursuing his own interest, he 
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than 
when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much 
good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It 
is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, 
and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from 
it (2001, p. 484–485). 
 
If Smith is advocating, in no uncertain terms, that external 
regulation is our enemy, then he seems to be contradicting himself not 
three paragraphs later when he writes, “if a foreign country can supply 
us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better 
buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry 
(Smith 2001, p. 487).” Rather than contradicting himself so blatantly 
(see quote below), we think it is more likely that Smith is making a 
more nuanced argument than might be clear at first blush. We must 
take into account the mercantilist times Smith lived in; regularly, 
governments tried to manipulate tariffs, taxes, and subsidies to best 
each other. Conversely, Smith was very aware that the short term 
interests of businesses were not always naturally aligned with the 
public interest as seen by government.  
 
The interest of the dealers…is always in some respects different 
from and even opposite to that of the public.... The proposal of 
any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this 
order ought always be listened to with great precaution, and 
ought never to be adopted till after having been long and 
carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with 
the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men 
whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, 
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who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress 
the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions 
both deceived and oppressed it (Smith 2001, p. 292). 
 
In discussing regulations, Smith is focused on these tendencies 
toward manipulations. When he takes aim at efforts to guide 
economies, Smith is making an argument against protectionism. His 
critique is aimed at the inefficiencies and harm caused by tariffs, 
taxes, and subsidies, not necessarily all regulation. 
 
The notion of the invisible hand has become so poorly 
understood by modern audiences, that it often comes as shock to 
many that Smith wrote about beneficial regulations at all. William D. 
Grampp emphasis this point—Smith’s had no theory of The Invisible 
Hand; he only considered the metaphor of the invisible hand with 
regard to the movement of capital over national borders. Grampp 
considers the scope of the original metaphor, by stating, “the invisible 
hand guides a merchant only when circumstances induce him to keep 
his capital at home (2000, p. 447).” 
 
Later Grampp notes, [there are] 35 or 40 measures of 
government intervention of which Smith approved, or which he 
advocated…The most numerous have to do with helping buyers, 
sellers, and people in need of help of one kind or another (2000, p. 
460). 
 
Smith does not consider the invisible hand to be an impartial 
overlord of economic activity, ensuring moral outcomes. He seems to 
implicitly recognize what today’s economists call “externalities”—i.e., 
the costs that private actions impose on others, some unintended, 
some foreseen, but ones that might be considered for rectification. 
One analyst of Smith even writes: “Smith is often thought of as being 
indifferent, even hostile, to the poor. On the contrary, he was not 
opposed, as a matter of principle, to redistributing income: He wanted 
to tax horse carriages so that “the indolence and vanity of the rich is 
made to contribute in a very easy manner to relief of the poor (Nasar 
1994).” 
 
That said, a balanced reading of Smith both suggests and 
explicitly points to “laws of justice” that must not be violated in order 
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to ensure the ability of agents to pursue their interests. Laws that 
apply to economic actors equally, in order to ensure a more level 
playing field, are acceptable. Smith’s critique of government oversight 
is primarily aimed at rules and regulations that give some competitors 
an advantage or disadvantage. The invisible hand is not 
the arbitrator; we still need some form of external governance for 
that. The invisible hand, which is only mentioned four times 
throughout Wealth of Nations, is at most a descriptive mechanism; 
one that shows how the pursuit of economic self-interest can 
commonly yield unintended positive outcomes beyond the scope of the 
individual’s self-interested decision.  
 
And when discussing banking, Smith also acknowledges that 
government regulation can be justified due to the consequences to the 
public. This is because, the risk of failure of certain elements is of such 
high consequence that restrictions on the completely free dealings of 
the banks are worth the loss of some economic liberty. By restricting 
the most egregious endangerments, the whole of society is made 
better off. When successful, regulation does not, as is often argued 
today, generate inefficiency; Smith argues that it can help ensure 
better dealings by recognizing negative and harmful tendencies within 
an industry. At their best, good regulations can actually promote 
greater freedom. The free market depends on free 
actors, not the other way around. 
 
Deconstructing the Simplified Portrait of Milton 
Friedman 
 
Milton Friedman lays out his thinking on managerial 
responsibilities quite succinctly when he writes, 
 
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate 
executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has 
direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to 
conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which 
generally will be to make as much money as possible while 
conforming to their basic rules of the society, both those 
embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom. Of 
course, in some cases his employers may have a different 
objective. A group of persons might establish a corporation for 
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an eleemosynary purpose—for example, a hospital or a school. 
The manager of such a corporation will not have money profit as 
his objectives but the rendering of certain services. 
In either case, the key point is that, in his capacity as a 
corporate executive [emphasis added], the manager is the 
agent of the individuals who own the corporation or establish 
the eleemosynary institution, and his primary responsibility is to 
them (1970). 
 
At first blush, this might seem callous and dismissive toward 
notion that corporations are also citizen-members of communities. 
From the standpoint of stakeholder theories, our intuitions suggest 
that as members of communities, business, like the individual folks 
within those communities, have definable moral responsibilities to the 
other members of those communities. From the standpoint of 
shareholder theories, Friedman seems to be promoting a view that 
‘business does what business does’ apart from the goings on of the 
rest of society, and that the best thing a business can do for society is 
make money—therefore, its ability to earn profits ought to be 
unimpeded. 
 
Contrary to this interpretation, Friedman explicitly advocates for 
the role of governments and other institutions as impeders of business 
in this way. Friedman writes that, “The role of government just 
considered is to do something that the market cannot do for itself, 
namely, to determine, arbitrate, and enforce the rules of the game 
(2002, p. 27).” Free markets, aren’t, as the dominant rhetoric 
suggests, unchained from regulation and rules. Free markets, for 
Friedman, are beholden to proper regulations and rules. Drawing on 
Adam Smith no less, Friedman argues, 
 
It is the responsibility of the rest of us to establish a framework 
of law such that an individual in pursuing his own interests is, to 
quote Adam Smith again, ‘led by an invisible hand to promote 
an end which was no part of his intention (2002, p. 133).’ 
 
Advocates of traditional formulations of corporate social 
responsibility can think about this passage with a thought exercise. 
Suppose a factory is the source of significant pollutants that are 
damaging a river. Currently, there are no local or federal regulations 
that prohibit this, though there is good evidence that the pollutants 
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are having a detrimental effect on the surrounding community. The 
factory has the ability to dramatically reduce emissions, but at great 
financial cost. Friedman argues that in this circumstance, the factory 
management ought to first, consider the goal of the owners. If the 
owners want to prioritize environmental concerns, so be it. That’s 
certainly the prerogative of the owners, for Friedman. But if the 
owners want to prioritize profit however, it is the managers’ 
responsibility to do that. In this scenario, some advocates of CSR 
might argue that management must consider all of the stakeholders 
before making a decision. As the community around the river is made 
up of stakeholders, their concerns must be factored into business 
decisions. This however, pushes well beyond the basic structure of the 
business. Friedman’s point is that, businesses do not—and should 
not—make the rules of the game; it’s beyond their scope. Businesses 
are institutions that make money via service provision; that is their 
primary function. If we want a clean river, we (the people) need to 
make the rules such. Do we truly want the manager of the factory 
determining what the rules of the game ought to be? What about 
scenario’s where the good or right thing is not as seemingly obvious? 
For example, suppose it is known by the managers that a very tiny 
amount of a lethal chemical is leaking into the water? We end up in 
the situation where different managers make very different decisions 
in the name of corporate social responsibility. Friedman wants 
managers to defer ethical judgments to the corporate charter of their 
organizations, or effective oversight institutions—the government. 
 
The upshot here is that Friedman is not simply prioritizing 
business over ethics; he’s advocating for a decoupling of business and 
ethics insofar as we expect business managers to create society’s 
ethical frameworks. Friedman’s point is that not only is this bad 
business, but it’s also bad ethics. If we want businesses to adhere to 
particular ethical principles, we must codify those rules. If we want to 
achieve particular society goals, such as taking care of those that are 
worse off, we must engage or even create other institutions that are 
better served at meeting those goals. In this way, Friedman is not 
denying the ethical endgame of those who prioritize stakeholders. We 
believe a fair-minded reading of Friedman does not result in a trade-
off between stakeholder theory and shareholder primacy. Friedman’s 
perspective is not that of the heartless corporatist, but that of a 
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functional realist, depicting which institutions ought to be focused on 
what particular societal goals and goods. Profit motivated business, for 
all of its far-reaching impact, still operates in a narrow way. According 
to the Friedman view, tasking it with things beyond its scope is not 
only unfair to the business, but detrimental to society. If we want 
money out of politics, codify that; if we want institutions that 
redistribute income from the top brackets to lower ones, codify that as 
well. Friedman understood that the free market is not the embodiment 
of delivered morality, but instead, it is a powerful instrument of 
resource allocation. The market is but one societal instrument among 
many that, when regarded and constrained properly, can generate 
good moral outcomes. Here is the bottom line: For Friedman, ethics 
exists in legal consensus, and ethical forces exist outside the 
agent, e.g., the manager who is only tasked with doing her job. The 
danger is that without strong countervailing institutions, such as the 
prudent regulations of government, the protocol of Friedman can be 
detrimental to society. It makes little sense to talk about “business 
ethics” from Friedman’s standpoint. The market is defined in fairly 
narrow terms, and there is little regard for society’s best interests. 
This compartmentalized position stands in stark contrast with the more 
altruistic and society focused view of Smith, at least when Smith is 
seen in the context of his Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
 
Prioritizing Effectiveness over Strict Efficiency 
 
To summarize what has been argued thus far: 
 
1. A careful reading of both Adam Smith and Milton Friedman does 
not reveal the mania for unconstrained free markets that 
ideologue caricatures of those two writers often claim. 
2. Adam’s Smith’s invisible hand, a metaphoric ideal in the main, 
does not pre-empt a role for personal ethics or targeted 
government intervention. 
1. Milton Friedman’s profit focused management style for agent-
managers, while clearly skeptical of managers exercising their 
individual ethical values, is compatible with stakeholder 
empowering strategies as long as those values are embedded in 
the law or the operational charter of that corporation. 
 
One abiding legacy of both Smith and Friedman is that they 
recognized the efficiency of free market allocations and the importance 
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of allowing managers to focus on their primary function of economic 
provisioning. However, they both suggest that other market outcomes 
beyond pure efficiency matter to the society and that to achieve such 
effectiveness, both markets and business actions sometimes needed to 
be externally constrained. Put another way, economic efficiency is 
mainly directed at transactional resource allocation; market 
effectiveness takes pro-social and pro-environmental outcomes into 
account. 
 
While this is primarily an analytical essay on the doctrinal 
implications of carefully reading Smith and Friedman, we offer some 
concluding normative thoughts on the nature of constraining 
institutions and their purposes. That is, we briefly address what sort of 
constraints larger societal institutions might provide upon managerial 
actions and market machinations. And, we preview what factors should 
be kept in mind if the efficiency of free markets is ever to be 
constrained for societal effectiveness. 
 
Drawing partly on the recent writings of (one of) the authors, a 
few threads of the needed debate are proffered below. The discussion 
is not meant to be comprehensive by any measure, but rather to 
suggest that MBA classroom discussions and op/ed essays should 
delve deeper than the superficial “free markets, minimum regulation 
and an eye to profit are all that’s needed” mantra. 
 
How deterministic are the invisible hand metaphor of Smith and 
the “discount corporate social responsibility” views of Friedman 
in shaping contemporary business views? 
 
The short answer here is that no organization is required to 
embody in its operational decision-making the simple minded views of 
Adam Smith and Milton Friedman that we critique above. There are 
many case studies of enlightened business firms that have embraced 
corporate social responsibility; that regard proactive ethics as 
instrumental to good business; that work in partnership with local, 
state or federal government to clarify, demarcate and secure 
stakeholder fairness. On the other hand, it is also difficult to watch a 
financial news TV program or read the editorial page of a business 
periodical without someone proposing that if only markets were 
deregulated and compliance costs were eliminated, profits would soar 
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and whatever “problem” was at focus would be instantly solved. Too 
often, the source authority for such views, if given, is attributed to a 
long standing wisdom proposed by Adam Smith or Milton Friedman, 
unfortunately misunderstood. Typically, this is followed up with public 
policy recommendations to remove or delimit regulation of business 
and/or to measure “success” by purely what the market decides. Thus, 
the complex issue that we address in this essay is stronger and more 
enduring than the proverbial straw man. 
 
What are the elements of business performance that go beyond 
self-interest and profitability in assessing business 
effectiveness? 
 
Our above discussion of Smith and Friedman begs the question, 
‘Why does society care about a level of business impact that goes 
beyond mere economic efficiency?’ On one level, it is tempting to glibly 
ask: “Does everyone remember the copious financial shenanigans 
leading to the global recession of 2007–08?” But the better answer lies 
in the fundamental social contract that exists between businesses and 
society (Laczniak and Murphy 2014). Within a capitalistic system, 
businesses play a major role in providing the goods and services that 
all communities require to flourish and grow. In exchange for investing 
capital, fostering innovation and bearing risk, the rewards of profit 
rightly accrue to participating business organizations. However, the 
license to operate as the “provisionary” of needed products and 
services comes from society. For example, according to the U.S. 
Constitution (Article 1, Section 8), the federal government 
(representing society) reserves the right to regulate commerce in the 
public interest. Similar institutional constraints upon business activity 
are extant in almost all developed economies. In this macro context, 
society is understandably concerned with social outcomes other than 
the profits to which business aspires. Often, even as local businesses 
prosper, the mix of goods and services being provided by 
unconstrained markets and unregulated operations is not optimally 
beneficial to the broader society. For instance, primary to this inquiry 
might be questions such as: Are the type of goods required by the 
public being provided in sufficient quantity and at a fair price? Does 
distribution and marketing cost too much? Is business providing as 
much to the host community (i.e., fair taxes being paid) as it receives 
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from it? Are the economic successes of a publically supported business 
climate being shared equitably with the host community? 
 
Along with the policy implications of such questions, society 
does not wish to bear undue costs from the side-effects of business 
endeavors (e.g., environmental pollution, exploitation of workers, 
predatory rent seeking). Minimally, this means ala Friedman, that 
business is expected to conform to the existing law. Proactively, the 
social contract would imply that Business [writ large] be evaluated on 
implicit social dimensions such as effective job creation, living wage 
rates, whether investments have reasonable long-run sustainability, 
the absence of stakeholder exploitation and, if companies pay their fair 
share of taxes to support the public infrastructure from which they 
directly benefit. Thus, the notion that financial outcomes for individual 
firms should be “maximized” clearly can be at odds with the principle 
of the common good as perceived by society. 
 
What societal institutions provide the oversight to constrain 
certain market workings and the operations of business to 
enhance societal effectiveness? 
 
In order that the social welfare of all stakeholders are protected 
from the sometimes negative side-effects of business operations, 
various institutional entities need to guarantee the power structure 
required by society to receive what is their due, i.e., a just 
marketplace that balances the right of buyers and sellers. Put 
differently, it is institutions and their associated oversight 
arrangements that provide the power to assure fairness in business 
operations when it does not naturally occur (Santos et al. 2014). The 
entities that do this—the essential instruments of transformative 
justice—include primarily the government, but also industry 
associations, professional bodies (e.g., the ABA), and corporate 
cultures, especially when driven social purposes embedded in their 
charters. As the role of government has been primary in our 
discussions of Smith and Friedman, our brief commentary here centers 
on the government regulation. 
 
One way that the government can ensure that the rights of all 
stakeholders are protected is by enacting legislation and enforcing 
existing regulation aimed at ensuring that a firm’s stakeholders are not 
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exploited by corporations in their quest for efficiency. Our above 
discussion of both Smith and Friedman seems to dutifully allow for 
such adjustments. For instance, many states in the U.S. have passed 
legislation that caps the interest rates that lenders can charge on 
various financial transactions, regardless of what supply and demand 
might dictate. In a similar vein, the Federal Reserve Board approved 
rules in 2008 that protect credit card users from assorted unfair 
practices of credit card companies. In addition to legislation that acts 
as a protective shield against abusive and exploitive practices of 
stakeholders, the government also can implement various pro-
business policy measures such as tax-breaks and subsidies that 
encourage greater investment in certain economic sectors that are not 
well served. For example, incentives might be utilized to attract 
retailers of healthy food to economically challenged city markets. 
Obvious impediments to utilizing government as the successful 
guarantor of the power necessary to achieve transformative justice for 
all of society’s stakeholders are its historic bureaucratic inefficiencies 
and/or its corruptions—situations all too common in the public sector, 
and a fact recognized by Adam Smith back in 1776 (Wilson 1989). 
 
What considerations do unfettered markets routinely ignore? 
 
Economics has a “stylized response” for making market 
adjustments. Consistent with the ideologue view of Smith’s ‘invisible 
hand” metaphor outlined above, markets, if left “free”, should be self-
adjusting. Consistent with Friedman’s disposition to profit 
maximization by business without open-ended social concerns, 
economic efficiency will win the day. But economic efficiency is not the 
same thing as effectiveness for the society in terms of its economic 
needs, a point we have argued that both Smith and Friedman in fact 
realized, despite the sometimes simplification of their positions by 
others. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a key measure of economic 
contribution, is not the same thing a “societal wellness” anymore than 
the absence of disease is a complete measure of a person’s good 
health. For example, GDP grows when more persons are incarcerated 
in prison, or when local disaster clean-ups occur or when ‘cheap’ 
handguns are manufactured. But are such expenditures a measure of 
a community growing healthier? Most folks would say “not” and argue 
instead that their common good is something far more complex. 
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To understand business and market contributions from a social 
contract standpoint, the triple bottom line of outcomes—financials, 
positive social impact and ecological sustainability should probably be 
measured—i.e., profit, people, planet (Bhattacharya and Korschun 
2008). Understanding such desired societal outcomes from business 
activity in multiple markets seems a strong first step in coming to 
grips with the ultimate purpose of economic systems. 
 
The rationale for wanting “healthy” markets that are efficient 
and effective in their operations is to create and promote economic 
wealth consistent with society’s common good (Laczniak and Lusch 
2016). We define the elusive “common good” as including all the 
necessary steps to create and maintain markets which have the 
capabilities to assure a flourishing community of stakeholders. The 
basic logic chain, in summary, is as follows: Societies require healthy 
markets to optimally develop. There are defensible characteristics that 
comprise markets that can be designated as “healthy. The protection 
of certain basic rights for all stakeholders contributes to such markets, 
which again are essentially instrumental because they allow for 
exchange mechanisms that serve the greater “good” of society by 
contributing to both economic rewards for business and positive social 
outcomes for society. Long term economic wealth (shared profits) is 
the reward for doing these tasks well. Added to this is the idea that 
most business executives, consistent with the motivations behind 
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, should want to help steward a 
fairness that flows from the brotherhood of all men and an inherent 
sympathy to that reality. 
 
Further we suggest that the implicit social contract between 
business and society includes: 
 
1. Promoting human flourishing for the common good. The full 
measure of an economy is found in more than its GDP but in 
how it enhances the quality of life for all its participants and its 
sustainability for the society (e.g., the availability of an 
assortment of jobs that pay a living wage; protection of the 
physical environment for future generations; how an affluent 
economy treats is poorest citizens). 
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2. In a market economy the common good involves helping to 
create healthy markets that are characterized by: (a) a greater 
sensitivity to differences in consumers’ needs, wants and 
preferences, (b) higher quality goods and services, (c) greater 
innovativeness, (d) higher productivity, and (e) greater 
economic growth. This requires looking at the healthiness of the 
business system not merely from the financial perspective of 
individual players but also from its social/environmental (i.e., 
macro) dimensions and their interactions. This is a lesson often 
lost in an ideological reading of Friedman or a too narrow 
reading of Smith. 
3. In a market economy the common good cannot be fully 
achieved through endogenous market processes but requires 
the development and fostering of the eight fundamental rights 
of market exchange that often must be guaranteed by 
government regulation: (a) the right to safety, (b) the right to 
be informed, (c) the right to choose, and the (d) the right to be 
heard. Other rights that are often needed for a market economy 
to operate in a healthy manner are: (e) private property 
protections, (f) relatively unconstrained personal freedom, (g) 
freedom from coercion, and (h) fairness oversight. 
 
These rights and considerations, which protect and constrain 
business actions, are hopefully guaranteed by the laws according to 
which Friedman advocated individual business must abide. In addition, 
Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” is not alone sufficient for healthy 
markets; free enterprise should more correctly be understood as 
constrained enterprise formulated for a common purpose—i.e., the 
provision of needed resources to the community via a financial 
incentive system aided by self-interested businesses. And neither is 
Friedman’s “profit maximization” a sufficient condition for society’s 
economic health since the rights of healthy markets outlined above will 
often not occur without governmental protections. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued for a change in how we portray the free market 
“at its best.” We think the prevailing perceptions of an unfettered, 
unregulated market as being best as been exacerbated by a 
misreading of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman. Rather than simply 
focusing on how well the economic game can be played, we suggest 
that a move from “economic efficiency” to “market effectiveness” 
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would better reflect a focus on the societal common good. The market 
is a tool to generate, proliferate, and manage the resources we need 
to flourish as a society. Even allowing that the free market can 
efficiently generate a multitude of goods, market success alone is not 
a desirable end goal. Thoughtful policy-making with an eye toward the 
common good can create an environment where responsible business 
practices are not only economically efficient, but effectively advance 
society’s higher interests. 
 
In this paper we have attempted to, first and foremost, help set 
the table for rational, reasoned discussion when it comes to the 
intersection of economic policy and ethics as perceived by Adam Smith 
and Milton Friedman. We looked at only a sliver of what Smith and 
Friedman had to say about economic efficiency, albeit some of their 
most salient and frequently quoted points—the invisible hand 
metaphor and the call for management to be dominantly focused on 
profit maximization. Certainly, there is much to be discussed in this 
sphere, and we have entered the fray with certain assumptions—
namely the priority of the common good when it comes to good policy-
making aiding societal welfare. Even so, we cannot begin to have a 
fruitful discussion about “good” economies if we do not take a serious 
look at the foundations behind our thoughts. The deserved legacies 
Adam Smith and Milton Friedman are a vital part of that foundation, 
and it is imperative that we be able to read, discuss, and apply their 
thoughts and ideas in good faith. Just as importantly, we hope that 
managers and policy makers will not be bound by dogma. Smith and 
Friedman are not above reproach, and though we have attempted a 
spirited dissection of their ideas in a balanced fashion, we cannot be 
afraid to move beyond them. There is much work still to be done. 
Particular policy recommendations are well beyond the scope of this 
paper, but we hope to have helped move the discussion forward by 
laying a general foundation for what constitutes market effectiveness 
for the common good and how that may differ from economic 
efficiency. 
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